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This thesis describes the development of a system of Data-Oriented Generation 
(DOG) wherein noun-phrases are produced as descriptions of simple visual stimuli. 
This is work towards a broader goal of developing a psycholinguistically realistic 
Data-Oriented theory of Sentence Generation. Technologically, this is timely because, 
after sixteen years of research into Data-Oriented Parsing (DOP; the formalism was 
first proposed by Scha (1990), first implemented by Bod (1992) and has been further 
developed , for example, by Bod, (1998, 2003, 2006b), Bod, Bonnema and Scha 
(1996), Bod and Kaplan (1998) Goodman (2003), Hoogweg (2000), no-one has yet 
produced a system for Data-Oriented Generation. 
 Rather than use a logic-like formalism to encode meaning, the model of 
generation proposed operates by directly coupling linguistic exemplars with 
exemplars in other modalities – vision, in the present case, though, it is hoped that the 
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This thesis describes the development of a system of Data-Oriented 
Generation (DOG) wherein noun-phrases are produced as descriptions of simple 
visual stimuli. This is work towards a broader goal of developing a 
psycholinguistically realistic Data-Oriented theory of Sentence Generation. 
Technologically, this is timely because, after sixteen years of research into Data-
Oriented Parsing (DOP; the formalism was first proposed by Scha (1990), first 
implemented by Bod (1992) and has been further developed , for example, by Bod, 
(1998, 2003, 2006b), Bod, Bonnema and Scha (1996), Bod and Kaplan (1998) 
Goodman (2003), Hoogweg (2000), no-one has yet produced a system for Data-
Oriented Generation. However, the emphasis of the proposed research is cognitive 
rather than technological, as most DOP research to date has been. The particular 
model under scrutiny, Unmediated Data-Oriented Generation (UDOG), is inspired by 
the question; “Can one have a perceptually grounded linguistic semantics without a 
‘Language of Thought’ (LOT) to intervene between perception and utterance?” Or, 
put more broadly, “What is the input to sentence generation?” As such, the system 
proposed (First mooted in Cochran 2005) operates by means of direct connections 
between concrete exemplars of past experience in visual and linguistic modalities. 
 
Typically, while psycholinguists studying language production have assumed 
the existence of pre-linguistic messages providing the input for language production, 
philosophers have had grave misgivings about this. Typical of this latter trend is 
                                                 
1
 Much of the material in this introduction is adapted from Cochran (2004), a paper submitted for the 
MSc course, Language Production. Please note that although this paper was awarded a mark, I dropped 
out of the degree programme towards which this mark would have counted, prior to completion; 
therefore, this material has not counted, and will not ever count, towards the assessment of any degree 
except in its present form as part of the present submission. 
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Simon Blackburn’s argument (1984, p40-67) that the LOT Hypothesis is a “dog-
legged theory”, insofar as our ability to understand and perform operations with pre-
linguistic messages stands in want of explanation in precisely the same way as our 
ability to understand expressions in language, thus inviting an infinite regress. The 
argument at the heart of all this is Wittgenstein’s (1969) example of understanding the 
meaning of the word “red”, in which it is asserted that, if one supposes the mind to 
contain an image of “red” to provide the word “red” with meaning, it is functionally 
equivalent to having an image of “red” outside the mind to correlate word to meaning, 
say, a labelled card with a red patch painted on it. 
 
When I hear the order "fetch me [a red flower from that meadow]." I draw my 
finger across the chart from the word "red" to a certain square, and I go and 
look for a flower which has the same colour as the square. … [But] consider 
the order "imagine a red patch". You are not tempted in this case to think that 
before obeying you must have imagined a red patch to serve you as a pattern 
for the red patch which you were ordered to imagine.  
Wittgenstein 1969, p3. 
 
In contrast, psycholinguists have, without much discussion, tended to favour 
the assumption of pre-linguistic messages as a way of abstracting their desired object 
of investigation, the complex of systems by which we select the words, inflections, 
syntactic structures, phonemes and suchlike with which our desired meaning is to be 
expressed away from a matter which is murkier, more daunting, and less accessible to 
experimental research, that of how, in the first place, we decide which meanings we 
want to express. Levelt (1989), for instance, divides his “blueprint for the speaker” 
(p.9) first of all into the “Conceptualizer” and the “Formulator”. However, it is 
quickly apparent that while the Formulator is a fairly clearly defined set of linked 
subsystems for handling different layers of the surface structure of linguistic 
expressions, the Conceptualizer, by Levelt’s own admission, is a sort of 
heterogeneous “not-the-liver” category
2
 set up to do everything the Formulator 
doesn’t.  
 
                                                 
2
 I am indebted to Bedford (1997) for this singularly useful expression. It refers to a particular kind of 
fallacious category in cognitive science – one by which the discovery of a genuine category or “organ” 
within cognition is supplemented by the putative discovery of a second category comprising everything 
that the first doesn’t. 
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The sum total of these mental activities will be called conceptualising, and the 
subserving processing system will be called the Conceptualizer (in full awareness 
that this is a reification in need of further explanation – we are, of course, dealing 
with a highly open-ended system involving quite heterogeneous aspects of the 
speaker as an acting person) 
p.9, author’s emphasis. 
 
One finds in Levelt’s further exposition of the Conceptualizer (p70-106) that 
the output of “messages” which it feeds into the Formulator must meet certain criteria 
- they must be “propositional” (in a broad sense) (p.72-96), they must have 
perspective (i.e. carry information about topicality, news value, etc) (p96-100) and 
mood (eg. interrogative, declarative, etc) (p100-103), and be marked for whatever 
supplementary information the grammar of the language in question demands (eg. 
information about evidentiality is optional in English, but mandatory in Karaja (Maia, 
2000)). Levelt laments the absence of a “message grammar”, or any immediate 
prospect of one (p70). At this point, the “message” seems so much like language 
itself, that one or the other must surely be redundant. 
 
The strength of “Language of Thought” based approaches to meaning, and to 
question of the “input to language production” has been largely a consequence of the 
fact that any more holistic alternative seemed simply impossible to model, and 
therefore impossible to consider scientifically. What follows is a pilot for a model 





2.1 Data-Oriented Parsing 
 
The fundamental underlying framework for the present study is that of Data-Oriented 
Parsing, a model of Statistical Natural Language Processing first proposed by Scha 
(1990), and first implemented by Bod (1992). 
 
This summary adapts material from Cochran (2005) and Chen, Cochran, 
Hanafusa, Laskowski, Ludke, and Ntarila
3
 (2005). The simplest manifestation of 
STSG is DOP1, as described in Bod (1998 p12-23 and 40-50), though more 
sophisticated versions exist. The parser uses a large parsed corpus
4
 divided into a 
training corpus and a smaller corpus against which the parser is tested. The parser 
breaks every tree in the training corpus down into all its possible subtrees, according 
to the wellformedness rules below. 
 
1) Every subtree must be of at least depth 1. 
2) Every connection must have a node on either end 
3) Sister relationships must be preserved 
 
                                                 
3
 Note that the latter citation is of work elsewhere assessed for the present qualification. 
4
 Such as the the Penn Treebanks (in English, Chinese, Arabic, etc) or the "Developing a 
Morphologically and Syntactically Annotated Treebank Corpus For Turkish" Project sponsored by the 
METU Informatics Institute & Sabanci University  
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The parser is given test 
corpus strings and builds up new 
parse-trees for these using the 
fragments available to it from the 
training corpus, starting with a 
fragment with an S-node at the top, 
and then, for each nonterminal leaf-
node, working rightwards, 
substituting in additional subtrees, 
the topmost node of which must 
carry the same label as the node to 
be substituted. (see figure 2.1). 
 
In DOP research it is necessary to distinguish between parses and derivations. 
A parse is the tree structure expressed over a string; a derivation is the particular 
sequence of subtree substitutions by which it was constructed. When parsing with 
probabilistic context-free grammars (PCFG’s, see Manning and Schütze (1999, 
pp.381-405); note that a PCFG is equivalent to a DOP grammar in which subtree 
depth has been restricted to 1), there is a one-to-one mapping between parses and 
derivations, because all non-terminal nodes (nodes which have daughters in the 
completed parse and do not contain concrete representations of utterable content – 
words, morphemes, etc) must be substitution sites. In DOP, subtrees can be of any 
depth, and so in any given derivation, any subset of the non-terminal nodes could 
have been substitution sites, while the remainder will not have been. As such, if a 
parse contains N many non-terminal nodes, it will have 2
N
 many derivations. 
 
 For each subtree substitution t, its probability P(t) is calculated as its total 
frequency of occurrence |t| in the training corpus over the summed corpus frequency 





                                                 
5
 Note that although, beside the node-label on the substitution site, the input to be parsed is also a 
constraint on the selection of subtrees for substitutions, these constraints are not factored in to the 














John likes Mary 
VP Mary 
N 
o                      o         = 
Figure 2.1: A derivation of “John likes Mary”. 




      (2.1) 
    
 
…where r(t)and r(t') are the node-labels on the root-nodes of subtrees t and t'. 
 
The probability of a derivation is the product of the probabilities of its subtrees 
(note that o is the notation for the substitution operation; thus ntt oo ...1  is the 
sequence of substitutions, which together comprise the derivation); 
 
      (2.2) 
 
And the probability of a parse T is the sum of the probabilities of its possible 
derivations D; 
 
      (2.3) 
 
 The output of the parser is, in theory, the most probable parse. In practice, 
there are issues of computational complexity that prevent this from being calculated 
directly; but these will be addressed in §4.2 below. 
Bod (ibid p.54) reports accuracies of 85% on the ATIS
6
 corpus for DOP1. 
 
2.2 Data Oriented Semantics 
 
Although the present work reports the first model of Data-Oriented 
Generation, it is not the first attempt to incorporate representations of meaning into a 
Data-Oriented model; van den Berg, Bod and Scha (1994) and Bod Bonemma and 
Scha (1996) report two models of Data-Oriented Semantics in which trees from the 
Penn Treebank were extended with predicate logic-like annotations on the non-
terminal nodes. To give two instances of how this may be done, in the toy corpus 
illustrated in figure 2.2.a, expressions like ∃x(MANx & WHISTLESx) are located at 
the root node, and broken down with lambda-abstractions as you work down to the 
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terminal nodes (van den Berg, Bod and Scha 1994, cited in Bod Bonemma and Scha 
1996), whereas in figure 2.2.b, the expressions above the immediate parents of the 
terminal nodes are replaced with more abstract substitution-schemas (Bod, Bonnema 













Figure 2.2: Two toy corpora from; Bod, Bonnema and Scha (1996). The authors note that 
constraining DOP to process semantic annotations of the type shown in figure 2.2(b) actually 
improves the parser’s accuracy for syntax, and its overall processing speed. 
 
Logic-based representations of meaning are a relatively cheap way of 
representing semantics in an NLP programme; specifically, they do not in any way 
require models of the diverse cognitive modalities in which the meanings are 
grounded to be build into the model of language. The novel models that I will 
describe in the next chapter, by contract, operate by directly coupling linguistic 
exemplars with exemplars in other modalities – vision, in the present case, though, as 
will be seen, it is hoped that the model could be extended into other meaning-
providing modalities. It is furthermore hoped that models incorporating such direct 
couplings will prove much more powerful, not only in understanding linguistic 
meaning, but more generally the interactions between language and the other 









One of the earliest successes in Artificial Intelligence and Natural Language 
Understanding was Winograd’s (1972) SHRDLU programme. SHRDLU was a 
dialogue system, capable of interacting with a human user (via teletype) with relation 
to an extremely limited simulated microworld, consisting of blocks of different 
colours and shapes which it was capable of manipulating at the request of the user, 
and answering queries about them. The BLOCKS World which SHRDLU inhabited 
had its own basic physics (for instance, other blocks can be stacked on a cube, but not 
on a pyramid), and SHRDLU had an understanding of those physics which was 
capable of influencing its dialogue. SHRDLU was a collection of interacting 
programmes in which explicit procedural knowledge of the BLOCKS world, and the 
syntax and semantics of its 200 word vocabulary, was hand-coded. SHRDLU’s 
proved to be extremely impressive for its time; it could conduct perform inferences 
about blocks, learn vocabulary defined in terms of previous vocabulary, and conduct 
sensible, natural sounding dialogue with reference to its micro-world. Ultimately, 
however, the hand-coding of explicit knowledge proved to be a dead-end approach, as 
it proved to be highly brittle, domain specific and not scaleable. Dreyfus’s (1997) 
classic criticism of SHRDLU (cited in Clark 1991, pp. 25-27) follows argues against 
the hypothesis that microworld based SHRDLU-style AI could ever “scale up” from 
microworlds to anything comparable to the world as experienced by humans; Dreyfus 
draws on an example from and MIT internal memo circulated by Minsky and Papert 
(1970), in which they consider the domains of knowledge from which a child must 
draw to be able to understand the following sentence in conversational context; 
 
Janet: That isn’t a very good ball you have. Give it to me and I’ll give you my 
lollipop. 
 
…We conjecture that, eventually, the required micro-theories can be made 
reasonably compact and easily stated … once we have found an adequate set of 
structural primitives for them. 
(Minsky and Papert 1970, p. 48 & p.50, cited in Dreyfus 1997, p.147) 
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Dreyfus comments that this assumption of Minsky and Papert’s is ultimately 
untenable, because there in fact is no micro-theory for such a conversation separable 
from the rest of human experience and meaning. This, Dreyfus (ibid) casts as a 
general failure of the “micro-worlds paradigm”;  
 
 …it … is likewise misleading to call a set of facts and procedures concerning 
blocks a world when what is really at stake is the understanding of what a 
world is. A set of interrelated facts may constitute a universe, a domain, a 
group, etc., but it does not constitute a world, for a world is an organised body 
of objects, purposes, skills and practices in terms of which human activities 
have meaning … one cannot equate … a program that deals with a “tiny bit of 
the world” with one that deals with a “mini-world”. 
(pp.150-1, author’s emphasis) 
 
Dreyfus’s criticism sticks because of the ways in which our diverse cognitive 
competencies saturate one another, what Clark (1991, p.25) calls the “thickness” of 
our concepts, creating an explosively complex manifold of dependencies between 
different knowledges and modalities of knowledge that simply prohibits their direct 
modelling as explicit declarative knowledge; for a knowledge-representing formalism 
to stand as a “theory of content” that can be applied to worlds in Dreyfus’s sense, it 
must be scaleable and robust. The “atomism” underpinning Winograd, Minsky and 
Papert’s approaches fails that test. 
 
However, in many subfields of AI research, statistical, experience-based 
approaches, have, by comparison, proven to be highly robust and scaleable; for 
example, in Natural Language Processing (Manning and Schütze 1999), Vision 
Science (Kersten 2000) and Robotics (Thrun 2005); A fact which gives considerable 
weight to Brooks’ (Brooks 1997) suggestion that explicit knowledge representations 
are simply the wrong sort of abstraction to be working with when trying to model 
cognition. It is my hope that the method of directly coupling exemplars across 
modalities of cognition provides a direction for an integrated, multimodal approach to 








Another precedent worthy of note is the L0 Miniature Language Acquisition task 
proposed in Feldman, Lakoff, Stolcke and Weber (1990). The task was intended to 
integrate three domains of Cognitive Science research; vision, judgement and 
language; to design an algorithm which; 
 
• Could be trained using a corpus of simple images, consisting of 3-4 simple 
geometric figures (circles, triangles, squares, etc) paired with one or more true 
statements about these scenes in some arbitrary natural language  
• Which after training could be presented with novel images and judge whether 
novel statements about these images were true or not. 
• Which would be robust to being tested on many different languages, including 
non-Indo-European languages. 
 
The present project is of a similar kind differs from L0 in a few aspects; firstly, 
the system is trained only on English. This is merely a consequence of limitations of 
time, and should be remedied in due course. Likewise the fact that in the present 
work, the images used are only one dimensional, is merely a consequence of limited 
time; a proposal for a more sophisticated Data-Oriented Picture Parser, capable of 
handling 2D inputs, can be found in Cochran (2006a). However, my own interest lies 
more in the direction of modelling language production, rather than truth-judgements, 
and UDOG work will probably continue in that direction. This is not least because I 
hope to be able to integrate UDOG into Iterated Learning Simulations (Kirby 1999, 
Hurford 2000, Briscoe 2002); a model of social transmission of (linguistic) 
knowledge wherein generations of agents are taught a toy linguistic task, with the first 
generation being trained on a random language, and each subsequent generation being 
trained on the productions of the previous – notably, via a bottleneck, whereby no 
generation is trained on the whole language, but must generalise from their training 
input in order to be able to handle novel stimuli. These models have proved to be of 
 16 
considerable value in explaining various language universals in terms of the dynamics 
of cultural learning. 
 
Feldman, Lakoff, Bailey, Narayanan, Regier and Stolcke (1996) describe a 
candidate system for the “touchstone” of the L0 task, which combines language 
learning using a Probabilistic Context Free Grammar with visual learning using 
Artificial Neural Networks. Notably, their system is highly modular, employing 
heterogeneous architectures for different subtasks. In contrast, the UDOG approach is 
designed around a single, integrated system and a shared Data-Oriented architecture, 
which it is hoped will be able to scale up to integrating further cognitive modalities. 
 
2.5 The Ubiquity of Trees  
 
One notable feature of DOP-research is that the paradigm is not limited to language; 
Bod presents successful DOP models for music, trained on the Essen Folksong 
Collection (2002, 2005) and for equational reasoning in physics, using a corpus 
collected from undergraduate physics students at the University of Amsterdam (2004, 
2005). Coleman and Pierrehumbert (1997) successfully use a DOP-like model to 
predict English-speakers’ judgements of the phonotactic well-formedness of nonsense 
words. Cochran (2005) suggested that DOP might also be applied to motor memory. 
Tu, Chen, Yuille and Zhu (2005) propose that algorithms for parsing language into 
tree-structures may be adapted to vision, and indeed describe a Markov-Chain-based 
algorithm which does just that. In considering the role of trees-structures in cognition, 
it is helpful to set aside the visual “tree” metaphor, and consider them purely as data-
structures; specifically, “trees” constitute nested mappings of higher to lower level 
patterns of information. Given the diversity of cognitive modalities in which the merit 
tree-structural analyses has been shown, Bod’s (2005) characterisation of tree-
structures as ubiquitous to cognition seems to be a sensible working hypothesis for an 
integrative vision of Cognitive Science, but it can’t be the complete picture. The 
“nested mappings” referred to above seem to work well for mapping intra-modal 
relations in cognition, but alone they offer no mechanism for understanding the 
“saturation” of real human cognition with connections and correlation across 
modalities, to which Dreyfus (1997) alludes (see §2.3 above); beyond being a 
hypothesis with regard to language production and linguistic meaning, the model of 
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cross-modal connections between nodes in tree-structures described in the next 
chapter is the first intimation of a broader hypothesis regarding the informational 




As noted in the introduction above, over the course of 16 years of research into Data-
Oriented approaches language, no-one has yet published a model for Data-Oriented 
Generation; what follows in the current chapter is a description of two pilot-models 




The “Unmediated” in Unmediated Data-Oriented Generation signifies the absence of 
a logic-like code or “Language of Thought” to pass messages between subsystems of 
cognition; in the case of the task at hand, language and vision. Rather, what is 
proposed is a set of direct crossmodal couplings between particular exemplars in the 
signifier-providing system (language) and signified-providing system (vision). This is 
illustrated in an extremely simplified form in figure 3.1 
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Figure 3.1: paired parse trees over visual and verbal content, with crossmodal connections. 
Note that some crossmodals are omitted for clarity. The crossmodals are coloured only for 
clarity; the colours do not signify anything. 
 
Note that this illustration is considerably simplified on a number of counts, 
however; the picture-parse tree for a naturalistic two-dimensional image such as the 
one shown would be much more complex, and for clarity only a subset of the cross-
modal links for that pair of trees has been shown. Furthermore, in human cognition, 
the perception of an image like the one shown would not be describable by a surface 
tree alone – rather the perception of the image would be modified by a perception that 
the static image in fact represents a fragment of a time-sequence, that the patterns of 
black pixels on while represent intentional agents, that the squirting is an intentional 
act, and that certain details of the arrangement of pixels in the mouse and tortoise’s 
faces informs us of their affective states. 
 
Two terms of art in the preceding description stand out as being in want of 
further definition; “picture parse” and “crossmodal”. It is worth dwelling on these for 
a moment before proceeding, as they are crucial to the following model.  
 
Mouse squirts tortoise 
S 
NP VP 
V NP N 
N 
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In order to understand what is meant by a picture parse, I refer the reader back 
to my comments in §2.5, on “the ubiquity of trees”, to the effect that the nested 
information-structures represented by trees provide a highly general data-structure in 
cognition, whereby lower-level segmentations of cognitive content may be mapped 
onto higher-level ones; in vision, this comprises the relation of lowest-level feature 
recognition (Hubel and Weisel, 1963, 1965) to the identification of objects and 
assemblies of objects. This nested segmentation of the visual field has proven 
important in the field of computational vision science, where it has been found to be 
indispensable in the field of automated visual analysis; Tu, Chen, Yuille and Zhu 
(2005), for example, present an algorithm which uses Markov Chains to produce 
analyses if images “into their constituent visual patterns … in a spirit similar to 
parsing speech and natural language” (p.113). Von der Heydt (2004) reviews a 
considerable body of evidence for extra-striate areas of the visual cortex performing 
“intermediate processing” operations, which he characterises as “image parsing … 
which appears as a mediator between local feature-representations … and the 
processes of attentional selection and object recognition” (p.1139). However, the level 
of sophistication in modelling vision indicated in figure 3.1 above is simply beyond 
the scope of the present project (though, as noted above in §2.4, see Cochran 2006a 
for a proposal for a Data-Oriented Picture Parser). For the purposes of the present 
model, a rather simpler visual analysis is required; limited to a maximum of three 
layers of nested structure at most are used (as illustrated in figure 3.2 below); between 
the bottom layer of primitive objects (lines, dashes and dots) and the top layer, 
corresponding to the whole image, one mediating layer wherein primitive objects of 
the same type may be grouped into clusters of two or three may be found. A tree-
structure, therefore, seems natural and cognitively plausible to join up these layers of 
nested structure. As a further simplification, the primitive objects in the image will be 
arranged one-dimensionally, so that it can be parsed with a standard DOP1 parser.  
 
Broadly speaking, crossmodals are connections between individual nodes in 
the tree-representations of previously experienced cognitive structures from grounded 
in different cognitive modalities. In the case of the current model, the only modalities 
we are concerned with are vision and language, but in theory the integrated action of 
any grouping of cognitive modalities may be represented and mediated by 
crossmodals, at least provided the information in both modalities is organised under 
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tree-structures. In a sense, they perform a dual function; on the one hand, they 
mediate crude associations between pairs of trees associated in memory (in the case of 
the current models, between the parses of images and their descriptions); that is to 
say, they allow for a record to be kept of what trees were created at the same time, 
allowing cognitive systems (in the case of the present model, language production) to 
exploit statistical patterns and regularities regarding in the co-occurrence of pattern 
across modalities; patterns like “at times when verbal trees containing the morpheme 
‘cat’ are processed or produced, it is more likely than it is at other times that the 
patterns associated with the presence of cats will be found in the visual field”. This of 
course, only requires associations between whole trees, rather than particular nodes; 
thus the other function of crossmodals is to constrain more exactly which subtrees 
may permissibly be linked in a bimodal subtree (the term “bimodal subtree” means, a 
pair of unimodal subtrees joined by crossmodals; the term “unimodal subtree” is used 
to distinguish an ordinary well-formed DOP subtree from a bimodal subtree); the 
exact details of which combinations are permissible – what counts as a well-formed 
bimodal subtree – differs between the two models tested (see §§3.2 and 3.3 below for 
the details), so the function of crossmodals differs between the two models. In 
constructing the templates for the training corpora for the models, three factors 
determined the decisions as to which nodes in associated trees should be connected by 
crossmodals; 
1) If terminal content under verbal node nw (meaning, the set of 
words/morphemes represented by those proper descendent
7
 nodes of n
w
 
that have no daughter nodes) can be used to refer to the terminal content 
under visual node n
v
 (the set of primitive visual objects represented by 
those descendent nodes of n
v





will be connected with a crossmodal. The teal crossmodals shown in figure 
3.2 are of this type. 
2) If verbal terminal node tnw (a terminal node here being a node with no 
daughters, representing a word/morpheme or primitive visual object) can 






 will be 
connected with a crossmodal. The blue crossmodals shown in figure 3.2 
are of this type. 
                                                 
7
 Note that the term “descendent” is to be distinguished from “proper descendent”; that is to say, the set 
of descendants of node n includes n, whereas the set of proper descendants does not. 
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3) If a verbal terminal node tnw can refer to the part-whole relationship 
between visual node tn
v









 with a crossmodal. The orange crossmodals 
shown in figure 3.2 are of this type. 
 
Figure 3.2: Paired image and description trees, with crossmodal connections; note that some 
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In rough summary, the algorithm stores a corpus of such image/description 
pairings; the images employed are no more than one-dimensional arrangements of 
lines, dashes and dots. These are paired with, and crossmodally linked at multiple 
nodes to, noun phrases describing the images. The bimodal tree-pair shown in figure 
3.2 is an actual example of an entry from the training corpus used in the model. When 
presented with visual stimuli, the algorithm, beginning with a bare Y- node and a bare 
NP-node, generates novel tree-pairs by substituting the visual and verbal parts of 
paired subtrees extracted from the training corpus for random non-terminal leaf-nodes 
in the incomplete derivation, until one or both of the trees has no non-terminal leaf-
nodes. For any one stimulus, multiple derivations will be completed, which are used 
as a Monte-Carlo sample; a Monte-Carlo sample being a random sample drawn from 
an unknown probability distribution, used to estimate the probabilities of the 
distribution; in this case, it is used to approximate the most probable output. 
More formally; 
 
1) On the presentation of a novel visual stimulus, image i, the algorithm generates a 
bare Y node and a bare NP to act as the first non-terminal leaf nodes in the 
derivation (note that Y and NP are the labels on the root-nodes of all image and 
verbal trees respectively in the training corpus. 
2) A non-terminal leaf-node from the image of the derivation, and one or more from 
the verbal side, are selected to be substitution sites. The criteria for node-selection 
differ in the two different versions of the algorithm that were implemented, and so 
these will be detailed below in their respective sections. To clarify, a non-terminal 
leaf node is one which carries a node-label, such as *NP*, *PREP*, etc, (non-
terminal), but has no daughters at the current stage of the derivation, and so can 
serve as a substitution site. 
                                                                                                                                            
1) The parse of “to the left of” in the verbal tree is somewhat non-standard, and requires 
comment; this parse was chosen over the more typical interpretation, that “to the left of” and 
“to the right of” are in fact complex prepositions, because I wanted avoid treating any element 
as idiomatic; I wanted to ensure that the whole tree was treated as compositional and 
decomposable, thereby giving the simulations a harder job in the test stage. (Chapter 5). 
2) “line” and “dot” are immediate daughters of *ROOT* nodes, whereas “left” is not. This is 
because “left” does not take a plural, whereas “line” and “dot” do. 
3) The node-label *NN* refers to a nominal group. 
4) The nodes of the visual tree are labelled *X* and *Y* to distinguish those nodes that are the 
immediate mothers of terminal nodes (*X*) from those which are not (*Y*) 
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3) A random equiprobable9 unimodal visual subtree is extracted from the training 
corpus, subject to certain constraints to be enumerated below. To be exact, the 
probability of any token (tv
token
) of  visual subtree tv which meets the set of 
constraints C
visual














   (5.1) 
 
Where t' is any subtree (type), and |t'| is the number of tokens of that type. The 
constraint-set C
visual
 is simply intended to exclude any substitutions which, 
without seeing any of the rest of the corpus, could be shown to utterly preclude the 
generation of a tree with an arrangement of leaf nodes exactly corresponding to 
the arrangement of elements in the stimulus. Specifically, C comprises the 
following constraints, in relation to a stimulus s, where s is that sub-part of image 
i which occurs between the elements of the image corresponding to the closest 
terminal nodes or peripheries
10
 to the left and right of the substitution site (see 
figure 3.3): 
a) The root-node of t, t(root) must be labelled with the same label as the 
selected substitution site.  
b) The frontier of t, t(frontier) – that is to say, the leaf-nodes, both terminal 
and non-terminal, of t, must contain no terminal nodes not corresponding 
to any element in the stimulus. 
c) t(frontier) must contain no terminal nodes corresponding to elements in the 
stimulus in any order not found in the stimulus. 
d) t(frontier) must contain no subtree containing more leaf-nodes between 
any two terminals or peripheries than there are elements in the stimulus 
between the corresponding positions in the stimulus. 
                                                 
9
 Note that it is tokens of corpus subtrees that are equiprobable, not types; if a particular type is found 
twice in the corpus, it will be twice as probable as one that is only represented once. 
10
 Periphery is here to be taken to mean the black space to the left or right of the leftmost or rightmost 
nodes in the tree respectively 
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e) t(frontier) must contain no subtree containing zero leaf-nodes between any 
two terminals or peripheries if the number of elements in the 
corresponding space in the stimulus is greater than zero.  
 
Figure 3.3: Given image i and partial derivation T, the stimulus by which the generation of the 
next subtree is constrained will equal s; in the case shown here, t and t' violate C(d), while t'' 
violates C(e). 
 
The procedure of on-the-fly subtree generation, or “Subtree Roulette”, allows for 
the use of all subtrees without their needing to be stored and represented 
individually – rather one simply stores the corpus as whole trees; this serves as an 
alternative to Goodman’s (2003) PCFG-reduction method. Using this method, 
derivations are spatially and temporally linear in relation to tree- and corpus-size. 
There is not space here to fully detail the technicalities of this method, but in 
short, each tree-node is annotated with the number of subtrees it heads (given by 
then Stimulus (s) =                                                     and therefore 
      X                X           X          X                 X                 X          X         X 
t =                      Y                                        t' =                  Y 
                   X                  X                  
t'' =                        Y                                  
If Image (i) =  
…are invalid subtrees according to C
visual 
And Partial derivation (T) =
 
   X                    Y                     X                 
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equation 3.2), and each tree is annotated with the number of subtrees it contains 
for each node-label (i.e., if a tree contains two NP-nodes, one with 32 subtrees, the 
other with 4, the total will be listed as 36). Then, if, for example, a subtree headed 
PP is needed for a substitution, all trees containing PP-nodes are assigned a sub-
part of a range of integers from 0-NPP, where NPP is the total number of PP-headed 
subtrees in the corpus, and each tree’s part of the range is proportional to the 
number of PP-headed subtrees in that range. A random number between 0 and NPP 
is rolled, and the tree assigned the part of the range within which the random 
number fell is chosen; if the chosen tree contains two or more PP-nodes, this 
“roulette wheel” procedure is repeated to decide between them. Finally, a top-
down breadth-first traversal of the tree is made, omitting the root-node of the 
subtree, at each node i casting a random number between zero and ti, where ti is 
the number of subtrees headed by node i, and removing all descendants of i if the 
roll come up as zero. In this way, all subtrees headed with PP have a probability of 
1 over NPP. 
4) This visual tree is combined with one random equiprobable unimodal verbal 
subtree tw (or, depending on the version of the algorithm, a set of verbal subtrees 
tw1 … twn) to form a bimodal subtree. The generation of verbal subtrees is subject 
to the following constraints, C
verbal
.  
a) tw must be taken from the same corpus tree-pair as the visual tree already 
selected. 
b) tw must be rooted in nodes bearing the same labels as those selected to be 
substitution sites in step 2 
c) The resulting bimodal subtree must also meet the the criteria for the well-
formedness of bimodal subtrees. These criteria, like the criteria for node-
selection, differ in the two versions of the algorithm, and will be detailed 
below in their respective sections. 




 is given 













   (3.2) 
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5) The bimodal tree is substituted for the nodes at the selected substitution sites, and 
the elements in the image corresponding to terminal nodes on the image side of 
the subtree are marked as having been accounted for by those terminal nodes; this 
is to facilitate the finding of the stimulus s for the next substitution, as specified in 
step 3. 
6) Some nodes in the visual trees exist in slave-master relationships to their 
immediate sister-nodes. Slave nodes cannot be selected as substitution sites, but if 
a master node is a substitution site, then a copy of the subtree substituted will also 
be substituted at each slave, and each non-terminal leaf-node of the copy will aso 
be enslaved to the corresponding node in the original. Similarly, when image 
subtrees are extracted from the corpus, the material underneath any slave-node 
must be identical to the material underneath their master. This is necessary to 
allow groups of repeated elements to be recognised as such, like the pair of dots in 
the image-tree in figure 3.2; this is essential for the algorithm to be able to subitise 
such groups and reliably describe them in numerical terms. For a fuller 
explanation of the job done by this subsystem, see §4.3.3. 
7) If no bimodal subtree can be found, the algorithm “backtracks” by undoing the 
last bimodal subtree substitution; that is to say, all descendant nodes of the last 
successful substitution site will be removed from the tree. Arbitrary constants can 
be set to limit the number of such reversals before the preceding substitution must 
also be undone, or, globally, before a derivation be abandoned outright as a dead-
end. In all test runs conducted for the present study, these constants were set at 
100 and 100,000 respectively. 
8) Steps 2 to 7 are repeated until either one or both of the trees is complete (i.e., has 
no non-terminal leaf-nodes), or, as specified in step 7, the derivation is abandoned. 
If the derivation is successful, the resulting verbal tree is stored (whether complete 
or not) as part of the Monte-Carlo sample. 
9) Steps 1 to 8 are repeated until N many trees were accumulated in the Monte Carlo 
sample. In all test runs conducted for the present study, N was set at 500. 
10) Because the verbal strings contain more elements (words/morphemes) than the 
visual images employed, the trees by which they are parsed contain far more 
nodes, and therefore more potential substitution sites. Therefore, the great 
majority of derivations will result in incomplete verbal trees. For this reason, it is 
not the most frequent verbal output that is selected from the Monte Carlo sample, 
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but the graph-theoretic unification of the largest unifiable subset of the sample. 
Because of the high prevalence of incomplete verbal trees in the output from 
derivations, instead of simply polling the Monte-Carlo set for the most frequent 
output, an algorithm, the details of which not relevant here, was used to find the 
largest unifiable subset of the trees in the sample. Two trees are taken to be 
unifiable if there is at least one possible (not necessarily complete) tree of which 
both trees are co-racinous
11
 legal subtrees according to the unimodal 
wellformedness criteria of DOP1. The unification of the two trees, then, is the 
smallest tree that meets this description, if any tree can. Two unifiable trees and 
their unification are shown in figure 3.3. The system’s output, then, is the 
unification of the largest unifiable subset of the sample. 
 
Figure 3.4; two unifiable trees (a, b) and their unification, (c); the working assumption here is 
that, although the trees output by UDOG are incomplete, they will tend, if the algorithm is 
working, to be fragments of correct outputs; therefore unifying them allows complete (or at 
least, closer to complete) trees to be made. If fragments of correct trees are indeed the most 
frequent output, the largest unifiable set should unify into a correct complete output. 
 
As noted above, two versions of the criteria for substitution-site selection and bimodal 
subtree wellformedness were tested; one in which the statistical regularities of the 
training data alone were trusted to do the job of solving the “binding problem”, and 
another in which the problem was addressed directly by restrictions placed on the 
selection and wellformedness criteria. The former, I shall refer to as “Naïve UDOG”, 
and the latter as “Binding UDOG”. The problem of binding may be stated as simply 
being the problem of ensuring that subtrees are placed in such a manner as to ensure 
that their proper places according to their semantic relationship; for instance, if full 



























(a) (b) (c) 
Y 
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sentences were being generated, part of this problem would be to ensure that the 
subject and object NP’s are placed in the subject and object positions respectively. 
 
3.2 Naïve UDOG 
 
In the naïve version of UDOG, exactly one substitution site are picked at random 
from the non-terminal leaf-nodes of each tree. A bimodal subtree is well-formed iff; 
 
1) Both of the component unimodal subtrees are well-formed by the normal 
standards of DOP1. 
2) Both unimodal subtrees should originate from the same tree-pair. 
3) The verbal subtree should contain only nodes which either; 
a) Have no crossmodal connections at all, or 
b) Have crossmodal connections, at least one of which is to a node in the visual 
subtree. 
 
It is worth seeing how this plays out in practice with a toy example. Consider 
the follow example of a corpus tree-pair P: 
 
Figure 3.5; a toy tree-pair; here, all crossmodals are shown 
 
Let us suppose that the following unimodal subtree tv is taken from the visual 
tree; 











Figure 3.6; a subtree (tv) of the visual tree in fig. 3.5 
 
This would leave one node of the verbal tree in violation of (3); 
 
 
Figure 3.7; One node in the verbal tree cannot occur in a verbal subtree in a valid bimodal 
subtree with tv 
 
Any subtree tw of the remainder of the verbal tree may validly be combined 
with tv to form a bimodal subtree; below are some examples; 














Figure 3.8; A non-exhaustive set of verbal trees tw that may validly be combined with tv 
 
 
3.3 Binding UDOG 
  
In Binding-UDOG, exactly one substitution site on the image tree is chosen at 
random, but then if this substitution site is crossmodally connected to any of the 
potential substitution sites on the verbal tree, it can in theory substitute subtrees at all 
of these sites, because a Binding-UDOG bimodal subtree can have one or more verbal 
subtrees. The wellformedness criteria are as follows; 
 
1) All of the component unimodal subtrees are well-formed by the normal standards 
of DOP1. 
2) All unimodal subtrees should originate from the same tree-pair P. 
3) Each verbal subtree should contain only nodes which either; 
a) Have no crossmodal connections at all, or 




























b) Have crossmodal connections, at least one of which is to a node in the visual 
subtree. 
4) The root node of each verbal subtree should be crossmodally connected to the root 
node of the visual subtree. 
5) No root node of a verbal subtree can be an ancestor of descendant of the root node 
of  any other; that is to say, if nodes n1 and n2 are in an ancestor-descendant 
relationship in the verbal tree W of the originating corpus tree-pair, they cannot 
both be selected to be the head-nodes of subtrees in the same bimodal subtree. 
6) The set of verbal subtrees in a well-formed bimodal subtree cannot be a proper 
subset of the set of verbal subtrees in any other well-formed subtree. 
7) For each node-label L represented x many times in the set of possible substitution 
sites, there should be no more than x many verbal subtrees in the bimodal subtree 
with root-nodes labelled L. 
 
The algorithm exhaustively checks all possible subsets of the set of nodes in 
the verbal tree connected to the root node of the visual subtree for validity, according 
to the standards of (5), (6) and (7). A subset is chosen at random, at a probability 



















     (5.3) 
 
-Where S and Si are sets of nodes, V is the set of valid sets of nodes according 
to criteria (5), (6) and (7) above, and subtreesnodex is the total number of subtrees 














   (5.4) 
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For each node n in the chosen set, a subtree t for which n = root(t) is chosen at 






tP =        (5.5) 
 
If it is either not possible find a substitution site, or a bimodal subtree, that 
meets the above criteria, the system backs off to the criteria of naïve UDOG. 
 
The purpose of the additional conditions is to alter the character of 
substitutions in binding UDOG, from individual substitutions of subtrees for non-
terminal leaf-nodes, to the substitution of a whole complex of crossmodally root-
connected subtrees for a complex of crossmodally connected non-terminal leaf-nodes, 
thereby preserving ordering relations across substitutions. 
 
This whole process is rather complicated, so it is worth drawing out with 
examples. Let us first consider substitution-site selection; consider the figure 3.9 
below as an example of a partial derivation D: 
 
Figure 3.9; Partial derivation; all crossmodals shown 
 
The parser selects randomly from X1, X2 and X3. Which of the non-terminal 
leaf nodes of the partial verbal tree D
verbal
 are available as substitution sites depends 
on which non-terminal leaf-node of D
visual
 is selected; if it is X1, A and B are 
available as substitution sites; if X2, it is B, C and D; if it is X3, X3 is not connected 
crossmodally to any available node, so the algorithm backs off to the rules and 








let us suppose that  it selects X2, and selects the subtree headed by the X2' node of 
visual tree P
visual




Figure 3.7; Paired trees P: for simplicity we will say that the set of crossmodals shown is 
exhaustive. Nodes and connection with emphasis represent the selected visual subtree tv. 
 
Recall that the available substitution sites are labelled B, C and D. This means 
that all the nodes crossmodally connected to X2 can potentially head verbal subtrees 
in bimodal subtree tb. However, not all of them are mutually compatible. B' and B'' 
cannot both be used, because there is only one substitution site labelled B waiting to 
be filled. C' and D' cannot both be used because they are in a ancestor-descendent 
relationship; we have four possible sets to be selected from; {B', C'}, {B', D'}, {B'', 
C'} and {B'', D'}. Now let us work out the numbers of subtrees: 
 
subtreesE = (0 + 1) =  1 
subtreesE' = (0 + 1) =  1 
subtreesE'' = (0 + 1) = 1 
subtreesD' = (0 + 1) = 1 
subtreesB' = (subtreesE + 1)(subtreesE' + 1) = 4 
subtreesB'' = (0 + 1) = 1 
subtreesC' = (subtreesE'' + 1)(subtreesD' + 1) = 4 
subtreesNP' = (subtreesB' + 1) (subtreesB'' + 1)(subtreesC' + 1) = 50 
                                                 
12
 Note that, as the mother of a terminal node, X2' only has one possible subtree. Also note that the 
primes used here do not denote a difference of node-label, and are only used to distinguish same-
labelled nodes in D and P. 
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subtrees{B', C'} = (4 + 4) =  8 
subtrees{B', D'} = (4 + 1) =  5 
subtrees{B'', C'} = (1 + 4) = 5 
subtrees{B'', D'} = (1 + 1) = 2 
 TOTAL = 20 
Table 3.1; totals of subtrees in valid sets. 
Thus; 
























Table 3.1; probabilities of subtrees in valid sets. 
 
Let us suppose that {B', D'} is selected. D' only has one possible subtree, tw1: 
 
Figure 3.11: tw1 
 





Figure 3.12: subtrees headed with B'. 
 
Now let us suppose that the third of these is selected as tw2, at a probability of 
0.25 (all four subtrees are have the same probability) This gives us the following 
bimodal subtree tb; 
 
Figure 3.13; Bimodal subtree tb. 
 
Finally, tb is substituted into P (P ○ tb = P')
13
: 
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Before going any further, some comment should be given regarding the 
rationale of the models; in particular, it is necessary, in the design of any 
computational model of a natural system, to distinguish scrupulously between those 
features that are intended to approximate the supposed real features of the system 
modelled, and those that merely constitute technological fixes of technological 
problems. This is a thorny problem, not only because it is necessary to open up thorny 
issues in the epistemology of modelling and simulation, but also because some of the 
specific issues involved cut across the spectrum of Data-Oriented research. I will first 
introduce in outline some of the relevant general issues of epistemology and method 
in modelling, before outlining how that has cashed out in practice, in Data-Oriented 
research generally, and in the current work in particular. 
 
4.1 Approximation and representation in simulation; the useful fiction of 
the substrate neutrality of algorithms 
 
With any novel development in scientific technique, new methodological and 
epistemological questions and challenges are sure to follow; and no new development 
in the past fifty years has had so been so pervasive across all disciplines of science as 
the development of computational simulation. Rohrlich (1991, cited in Hartmann 
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1996) characterises simulations (specifically discussing those used in physics) as “a 
qualitatively new and different methodology … that … lies somewhere intermediate 
between traditional theoretical physical science and its empirical methods of 
experimentation and observation” As such, a new literature in the Philosophy of 
Science has arisen to evaluate the methodological limitations and epistemic potentials 
of computational simulation. Hartman (1996) draws out the relationship between 
simulations and dynamic theoretical/mathematical models; under his understanding, 
such models comprise the mathematical characterisation of “a set of assumptions 
about some system” (p.4, citing Redhead 1980), and; 
 
 “a simulation results when the equations of the underlying dynamic model are 
solved. This model is designed to imitate the time-evolution of a real system. To 
put it another way, a simulation imitates one process by another process. In this 
definition, the term ‘process’ refers solely to some object or system whose state 
changes in time.” 
(ibid. p.5) 
 
The crucial tacit assumption here is that of the substrate neutrality of algorithms. In 
the ideal case, the model should describe the algorithm instantiated by both the 
simulation, where the particular implementation, in some particular programming 
language, on some particular computer, serves as the substrate, and the natural 
phenomenon, in some other substrate. However, it is important to realise that such 
substrate-neutrality is in fact a mathematical fiction; just as geometry defines lines 
and points as one- and zero-dimensional objects with zero area and volume, though no 
such objects exist in the real world, the Second Law of Thermodynamics requires that 
no algorithmic process in nature can continue indefinitely, without its causal 
processes eventually being interrupted or perturbed by the causal processes of its 
substrate
14
. It is simply that if, say, the behaviour of an algorithm running on a 
computer is changed by a bug in the implementation, or a block of memory being 
destabilised by the machine overheating, one says “that’s not the algorithm.” An 
algorithm is an axiomatically defined mathematical entity which, by fiat, allows us to 
                                                 
14
 This of course should not be taken as a denial of the great utility of algorithmic thinking, any more 
than it should be taken as a denial of the obvious usefulness of geometry. 
 40 
parse the totality of a natural (or computational) phenomenon into “algorithm” and 
“substrate”. 
A good example here is the debate between Dennett (1995) and Gould (Gould 
and Lewontin 1979, Gould 1997) regarding adaptationism, and in particular Gould 
and Lewontin’s (1979) hypothesis that non-adaptations, such as historical accident, 
the recycling of obsolete systems towards new functions, and especially “spandrels”, 
structural by-products of adaptive changes, capable of being subsequently co-opted to 
adaptive functions.(Gould and Lewontin 1979). Dennett, against this, claims that 
“either spandrels are not ubiquitous after all, or they are the normal basis for 
adaptations, and hence no abridgement at all of pervasive adaptation” (Dennett 1995, 
p.268). What this disagreement boils down to, I would contend, is a difference in the 
way the parties involved parse the phenomenon into algorithm and substrate; Dennett 
chooses to isolate only adaptation by transmission of mutation with selection as 
“algorithm”, and the residue is “substrate”. Gould regards non-adaptations as 
sufficiently important to the final state as to warrant their co-option from “substrate” 
to “algorithm”. In this light, given that in either case the algorithm remains a 
mathematical fiction, the disagreement must be recast as one about what constitutes 
the optimal scientific strategy, rather than the correct scientific finding. 
The relationship between the simulation and the natural phenomenon becomes 
further attenuated by the fact that it is not always feasible to implement the algorithm 
given by the theoretical model exactly as stated. Constraints of computational 
tractability, for instance, can steer a simulation away from the idealised form of its 
model. Krohs (2006) gives a nice example of Field and Noyes’ (1974) model of the 
Belousov-Zhabotinsky (BZ) chemical oscillator. Krohs notes that while the BZ 
reaction itself takes place in continuous time, the equations of Field and Noyes’ model 
can only be (tractably) solved in discrete time-steps, generating an error which can be 
reduced by increasing the number of time steps, up to the limit case where the number 
of steps is infinite and the error is zero. However, the floating point arithmetic 
employed by computers creates a rounding error with every time step, so that beyond 
a certain point the reduction in discretization error caused by an increase in temporal 
resolution is outweighed by the increase in rounding error. Similarly, the feasible 
implementation of Data-Oriented models falls somewhat short of the idealised 




4.2 Approximation and idealisation in Data-Oriented research 
 
Now, recall my thumbnail sketch of DOP1 in §2.1. This “textbook DOP” is in fact an 
idealisation from any real computational implementation of the algorithm. There are 
three principal areas in which real DOP implementations must exercise technological 
fixes in order to approximate the “ideal” version; any DOP implementation must have 
some way of dealing with the space complexity of representing the set of all well-
formed subtrees, which is as we shall see below exponential in relation to string 
length, and the time complexity of the task of finding the most probable parse, which 
is exponential in relation to corpus size.  
Also, more worryingly, despite being capable of representing dependencies of 
indefinite distance, provided they are represented in the training corpus, DOP in its 
ideal form is also only an approximation to human linguistic performance, since DOP 
grammars are limited to Context-Free-ness, and cannot reliably represent the (weak) 
Context-Dependence of natural language. As we shall see below, there are both 
theoretically significant and (merely) technological fixes to this problem 
 
  4.2.1 Storing subtrees 
 
To see that the complexity of storing all subtrees is spatially exponential in relation to 
string-length, consider the subset of subtrees, for any given tree, rooted in the root 
node of the overall tree, in which there are either no non-terminal leaf nodes (i.e, the 
subtree and the tree are identical), or the only non-terminal leaf nodes are those 
which, in the whole tree, are the immediate mothers of terminal nodes. Each unit of 
the string, then, corresponds to a two-valued parameter of the subtree; it may either be 
deleted, leaving its mother-node as a non-terminal leaf-node, or it may be retained. 
These parameters are orthogonal to each other, so if there are N many units in the 
string, there will be 2
N
 possible subtrees of the specified type. Since this is a proper 
subset of the total set of legal subtrees, it follows that the size of the complete set of 
legal subtrees will also be exponential in relation to string-length. 
 
The first DOP implementations solved this problem simply by either limiting string-
length (Bod, pers com), or taking a random sample of the possible subtrees, thereby 
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approximating the ideal form of the algorithm, with some success. Goodman (2003) 
removed the need to store all subtrees by developing a method known as “PCFG-
reduction” (probabilistic context-free grammar), in which one generates a PCFG  in 
which (binarized) DOP subtrees are constructed “on the fly” during derivation. Each 
CFG rule is expanded into eight PCFG rules, which differ according to whether each 
of the nodes (mother, left daughter, right daughter) is accessible to the substitutions 
entailed in constructing a subtree or in combining subtrees. The probabilities of the 
rules are modulated to ensure that the aggregated probability of a reconstructed 
subtree is the same as the probability of the same subtree in DOP. I will not expand 
here on the technical details, as I use my own alternative (albeit similar) solution to 
this problem in implementing UDOG. 
 
4.2.2 Finding the most probable parse 
 
The problem of finding the Most Probable Parse (MPP) presents an even more serious 
challenge. To quote Bod (1998, p43); 
 
A sentence may have exponentially many parse trees and any such 
tree may have exponentially many derivations Therefore, in order to find the 
most probable parse of a sentence, it is not efficient to compare the 
probabilities of the parses by exhaustively unpacking the chart Even for 
determining the probability of one parse, it is not efficient to add the 
probabilities of all derivations of that parse. 
 
Sima’an (1996) has proven that no polynomial-time algorithm can 
deterministically find the most probable parse. Numerous approaches have been 
employed to approximate the MPP. Often, this is achieved by using heuristic to 
exclude classes of subtrees (Sima’an 1999, Way 1999). However, Bod (2003b) has 
demonstrated that any limitation on the range of allowable trees results in a loss of 
accuracy; thus the method of choice remains the simplest; Monte-Carlo sampling, 
wherein an arbitrarily large sample of random parses is taken, and the most frequent 
is selected as the system’s “best guess” at the most probable parse, with a chance of 





The problem of consistently dealing with context dependencies is of a somewhat 
different character than the problems above, in that context-freeness is “built in” to 
even the idealised form of DOP; any DOP subtree t may be (with information loss) be 
rewritten as context-free rewrite rules, of the form root(t) → frontier(t), as 
demonstrated in figure 4.1; 
 
 
Figure 4.1: A DOP subtree rewritten as a context-free rewrite rule 
 
Because DOP uses all corpus subtrees of any depth, any long-distance 
dependency can be modelled if it is present in the training corpus. However, it cannot 
generalise over such dependencies Several solutions in which the ideal form of DOP 
is changed in theoretically significant ways; using either Lexical-Functional Grammar 
annotations (Bod and Kaplan 1998) or Tree-Insertion (Hoogweg 2000); these methods 
are not our concern here. What I wish to note here is that another way around the 
problem exists, which I count as a “technological fix” rather than a theoretical 
development; that is, the problem may be ignored. Human language is only weakly 
Context-Dependent, and only a small number of natural language utterances in any 
given corpus will contain long-distance dependencies. Moreover, if since DOP can 
model long-distance dependencies that are present in its training data, if the subtrees 
containing such dependencies are in Zipfian (Zipf 1949) distribution across the 
training and test corpora, most such dependencies encountered in the test data will be 
present in the training data also. A recent trend in DOP research has been towards 
models that accord increasingly greater importance to simplicity, which is to say, 






   a chance 
VP → Give NP a chance 
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describes SL-DOP (Simplicity-Likelihood), in which the simplest parse is selected 
from the n likeliest; for the optimal value of n, at n = 12, SL-DOP attained a state-of-
the-art F-score
15
 of 90.7%. This has since been bettered by Bod (2005), using DOP
+
, 
which simply selects the simplest parse and uses likelihood only as a tiebreaker when 
there is more than one simplest parse, with an F-score of 91.1%.. I attribute the 
success of these simplicity-oriented DOPs to the following two causes; 
 
1) Bod (2003b) notes that although very large subtrees tend to be rare and 
therefore have low probability, they nevertheless are very important to 
approximating the MPP, because they account for more of the completed tree, 
thereby reducing the number of substitutions in derivations, thus requiring 
fewer subtree-probabilities to be multiplied together. Therefore simplicity and 
likelihood will often yield the same result. 
2) Larger subtrees can capture longer-distance dependencies. By favouring larger 
subtrees SL-DOP and DOP
+
 capitalise better upon the long-distance 
dependencies present in the training data. 
 
4.2.4 Model-DOP, Simulation-DOP, Real-DOP? 
 
With the preceding remarks in mind, what are we to make of our hypothesis that DOP 
of some sort if broadly the correct hypothesis regarding how language is processed by 
human brains? What is the relationship between DOP in its ideal, “textbook” form 
(Model-DOP, to borrow Kroh’s distinction), its implementation in silico (Simulation-
DOP) and its hypothesised implementation in vivo (Real-DOP)? Unfortunately, the 
empirical work (here meaning laboratory experimentation on human subjects, rather 
than computational simulation) to test the validity of the claim that the human brain 
indeed implements DOP-like processes, let alone investigate what the 
implementational details of those processes is, has yet to be done. Indeed, most 
investigators, as in §1 noted above, are more interested in DOP for its potential as a 
technology, rather than as a model of human cognition. It is therefore unclear exactly 
                                                 
15
 The F-score is the standard measure of accuracy in parsing and other Natural Language Processing 
tasks; it is the harmonic mean of precission (percentage of elements in the output correct) and recall 
(percentage of elements in the correct parse found in output); for the equation for calculating the 
harmonic mean, see Chapter 6, footnote 18. 
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what epistemic (as opposed to merely pedagogic) work Model-DOP actually does. 
Recall for a moment the moral of the discussion of the Dennett/Gould debate in §4.1; 
that rather than being a type of process that one may find in the world, an algorithm is 
a mathematical/axiomatic specification whereby processes in the world may be parsed 
into “substrate” and “algorithm”. Here is it important to recognise that science is 
principally a strategic activity; by which I mean that epistemic and methodological 
decision-making in science is governed principally by the desire to be able to do more 
science.
16
 The idealisations made in algorithm-thinking allow us to generalise 
explanations over diverse phenomena, and it would be desirable if we were able to 
claim that Model-DOP is the core of the algorithmic specification that allows us to 
generalise explanations of the behaviour of Simulation-DOP to explanations of human 
linguistic behaviour; however, at best, this can only be part of the story. Because, as 
shown above, the parsing of the processes is a strategic move rather than an 
ontological commitment, different, even perhaps non-complementary, algorithmic 
specifications afford different generalisations that may themselves may prove to be 
complementary. We are therefore justified in asking whether alternative 
algorithm/substrate parses may afford novel generalisations; and in particular, 
whether some of the “technological fixes” present in Simulation-DOP are in fact also 
implemented in some form in Real-DOP. Bod (1998, p.49) notes, in a section on 
“Cognitive aspects of Monte Carlo disambiguation”, “It is unlikely that people 
disambiguate sentences by sampling derivations, keeping track of the error probability 
of the most frequently resulting parse.” However, in response to this, there are certain 
features of standard Model-DOP that we may wish to demote from algorithm to 
implementation; that is, the tacit assumption, with regard to the processing 
architecture, that exemplars are stored passively in memory and the recombination of 
subtrees into derivations and aggregation of derivations yielding the same trees takes 
place serially under a central processing system using a “worktable” of working 
memory. But an alternative story may be told wherein the neural representations of 
exemplars and the connections between them are themselves active computational 
units, and the brain computes multiple derivations in parallel as activation cascades 
                                                 
16
 Fully backing up this position would require a dissertation longer that the present one. Some of the 
claims are argued for in Cochran 2006b. Note that I this is not meant as any sort of cynical insinuation 
against scientists’ commitment to truth; rather, I hold that even the working definitions by which “what 
it is for a scientific claim to be true” is determined are themselves the product of strategic 
considerations. 
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through the interconnected neural representations of trees; in this case, the “seriality” 
feature of Simulation-DOP would be demoted to a implementational detail, whereas 
Monte-Carlo sampling would lose its status as a technological “fix” for approximating 
MPP, and become co-opted to the algorithm proper. What I am proposing here is not 
the construction of a new Simulation-DOP
17
, but rather a revised of Model-DOP 
whereby the relation if Simulation-DOP to Real-DOP may be reconsidered. Similarly, 
if such a parallelised DOP were to comprise a network in which the tree-nodes and 
connections were mirrored in the physical network, but supplemented with 
supernodes corresponding to node-labels (see figure 4.2 for a toy example of such a 
hypothetical model), Goodman’s (2003) PCFG-reduction method could be taken to 
model the probability of an actvation at node n being passed locally, to mother(n) or 
daughters(n), or via the “node-label” supernode to which n is connected, to some 
other node in some other 
 exemplar connected to the same supernode. In this way elements of PCFG-reduction 
(and elements of the Subtree Roulette method outlined in chapter 3; after all, the 
                                                 
17
 Which is not to say that I don’t have active-memory parallel derivation DOP simulations earmarked 
as a potential future project. 
Figure 4.2; An idealised toy example of a parallelised active-memory DOP 
parser; on receiving an activation, each node computes the probability of 
passing activation on to its mother, its daughters, or, via a supernode, to any 
other tree-node with the same node-label. In the figure, nodes and connections 
are shaded red to illustrate the passing of activation on receipt of the stimulus 
“You like pies”. With a larger corpus, such a model could generate multiple 
derivations in parallel 
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exemplars would, in this picture, be stored as whole trees) may be promoted from 
being implementational fixes to a computational problem, to being features of the 
algorithm – of Model-DOP. It is with this in mind that I now wish to turn to the 
question of how Simulation-UDOG may be parsed into algorithm and 
implementation. 
 
4.3 Reconsidering the present models 
 
Three aspects of the UDOG systems outlined in Chapter 3 are particularly in need of 
comment here; the postprocessing of the partial trees outputted by the generation 
process, wherein the largest unifiable subset of the output is determined and the 
unification of those trees given as the final output; the uses made of the crossmodal 
connections between the paired trees; and the master-slave system used in the visual 
parses.. 
 
  4.3.1 Unification 
 
The unification system must quite straightforwardly be admitted to be a technological 
fix for a shortcoming of both Naïve and Binding UDOG; it was my hope that in 
redefining the wellformedness rules for bimodal subtrees, so that a valid bimodal 
subtree may draw more than one unimodal verbal subtree from the training corpus 
tree-pair from which it is sourced, binding UDOG would mostly produce whole 
outputs in both modalities; this proved not to be the case, and the unification system 
was developed simply as a stand-in for the development of further versions of UDOG 
which I hope will eventually produce complete outputs, and therefore no longer need 
to unify outputs. The Unification process is itself cognitively implausible, not least 
because it is in fact a variation on the “maximum clique” problem in graph theory, 
which is known to be NP-complete (Karp 1972, Zuckerman 1993, Wikipedia 
contributors 2006). The maximal clique problem, given a graph in which only a 
subset of the possible pairs of vertices are connected by edges,  is the problem of 
finding the largest subgraph in which all vertices are connected by edges to all other 
vertices in the subgraph. If the output trees in the Monte Carlo set are each treated as 
one vertex, and edges are drawn between all only those pairs of output trees that are 
unifiable, it should be clear that this subtask of finding the maximum unifiable set is 
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equivalent to the Maximum Clique problem, and therefore the whole task of finding 
the largest unifiable subset is also NP-complete. A brute force algorithm was used to 
solve the problem, but the result was that the size of the Monte Carlo sample was 
severely restricted. Given the rapidity with which language users can compose novel 
sentences, it seems implausible that they should have to solve an NP-complete 
problem every time they try to do so.  
 
  4.3.2 Crossmodals 
 
The role of the crossmodals is somewhat less clear-cut. It is open to two principal 
interpretations; the first is that they are merely needed as an heuristic tool for 
excluding unlikely subtrees from the verbal derivation, and that this is in fact only 
needed because of the smallness of the training corpus; given a much larger body of 
data, and a much larger preferably also a much larger Monte-Carlo sample, the 
statistical correlation of visual and verbal subtrees in the training data would be 
enough to do the required work, and crossmodals would be unnecessary. The second 
is that crossmodals are in fact essential to guarantee the binding of syntactic/semantic 
relations. The Naïve and Binding versions of UDOG may be said to represent the first 
and second interpretations respectively. In this case, I would contend that the 
strategically optimal interpretation of the Simulation-UDOGs – regarding whether 
crossmodals ought to be included in Model-UDOG at all – cannot be prejudged a 
priori. As will be seen in the next chapter, the tests performed on Naïve and Binding 
UDOG were designed to help point towards a resolution of this ambiguity. 
 
  4.3.3 Master and slave nodes 
 
As noted in §3.1, some nodes in the visual parses exist in master-slave relationships to 
their immediate sisters; a the set of subtrees under a slave-node will always be exactly 
the same as the set of subtrees under its master-node, as illustrated in figure 4.4. The 
purpose of this is to ensure that a group of identical objects in the visual input - say, 
three adjacent dots - will be preferentially parsed so that their lowest common 
ancestor-node will have three immediate daughters, two of which are slaves of the 
other; the point being that such a set of nodes could only be used to parse a group of 
three identical objects, and will be crossmodally connected to verbal subtrees 
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containing the syntactic apparatus necessary for saying “three *N* -s”; the sort of 
bimodal subtree in question is illustrated in figure 4.3 below; 
 
 
Figure 4.3; a bimodal subtree used in parsing and describing groups of three identical objects 
 
 
Figure 4.4; substitution at a master node. 
 
Is this to be taken as part of Model-UDOG or not? The position here is slightly 
more complicated than in the previous cases, What must be made clear here is that the 
decision to use the visual modality as the source of meanings for the present models 
was purely pragmatic, and should not in any way be taken to imply a “picture theory” 
of meaning (Wittgenstein 1974); the particular form of the stimuli, of lines and dots, 
was chosen in order to allow for very simple, one-dimensional, concrete stimuli, and 
for the concepts required for their description to require no deeper analysis of the 
visual input than a surface parse. It was necessary to allow identical visual objects to 
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occur in (subitizable) groups, crossmodally linked to descriptions containing numeral 
terms, because otherwise it would not have been possible to generate a large enough 
set of diverse possible stimuli to train and test the systems on. However, this required 
a slight violation of the original premise, of sticking only to surface parses in the 
visual modality for meaning. However, the present models are to be seen as pilots for 
more sophisticated versions, capable of combining meanings from diverse cognitive 
modalities. The slave-master system was implemented to get the very little amount of 
numerical cognition required for present purposes, whilst avoiding the need to 
integrate into the model a full system of Data-Oriented Arithmetic/Numeration as a 
third cognitive modality, desirable though that may be in the long run. Probably for 
present considerations, it should be regarded as a technological fix – a piece of the 
implementation, rather than the algorithm proper. But it remains an unanswered 
question, if, at a later stage Data-Oriented Arithmetic/Numeration were to be 
modelled, how much would vision and language be implicated? Would something 
like the slave-master system have to be re-incorporated into surface visual processing 






Two sets of tests were conducted on both UDOG systems; a general test of their 
abilities to describe novel stimuli, and a “wug” test specifically geared to test their 
ability to generalize syntactic patterns over novel vocabulary items. The form of the 
tests is detailed below, and the results are given in the following chapter. 
 
 5.1 General 
 
For the general test, a 120-item corpus was automatically generated using a java script 
named “CorpusMonkey”; the CorpusMonkey was loaded with four basic visual 
objects and their names, detailed in table 5.1 below. 
 
Name Form 
“dot” 1 pixel 
“dash” Line of 3 pixels 
“short line” Line of 5 pixels 
“long line” Line of 10 pixels 
Table 5.1; basic objects used in the general test. 
 
The CorpusMonkey then generated all 120 possibilities for images consisting 
of either one group of one, two or three identical objects, paired with a description of 
the form “X”, “two X-s” or “three X-s”; or two such groups, provided each group is 
comprised of different types of basic object, paired with descriptions of either the 
form “X to the left of Y”, or “Y to the right of X”. Which form of description was 
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employed was selected at random, with equal probabilities. For examples of real 
CorpusMonkey generated tree-pairs used in tests, see figure 3.2 above, or figures 5.1 
and 5.2 below; 
 
Figure 5.1 A CorpusMonkey generated tree-pair; all crossmodals are shown. 
 
Figure 5.2 A very simple CorpusMonkey generated tree-pair; all crossmodals are shown. 
 
 Both images and descriptions were generated with annotations for tree-
structure, node labels and crossmodals from templates programmed into the 
CorpusMonkey. These were divided into six random subdivisions, and the test was 
performed in six stages, in each stage using a different subdivision for test data (from 
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were presented as training data. In the way, the models were tested on the entire 
dataset, all as unseen data. The purpose of this test was to assess the models’ general 
performance on unseen data. 
 
 5.2 Wugs 
 
A second batch of tests was run using an additional basic vocabulary item; the “wug”, 
which was simply a seven-pixel line. Here, the training data comprised all six 
subsections of the main test data, plus twelve identical exemplars of the form shown 
in figure 5.3 below. The new word and object, “wug”, was only present in the training 
data in these twelve exemplars. 
 
Figure 5.1; additional exemplar used in “wug” test. Note that the set of crossmodals shown 
here is complete. 
 
The test data comprised 72 stimuli in which all the possible arrangements of 
groups of one, two or three wugs placed to the left or right of one, two or three dots, 
dashes, short lines or long lines. As with the general test, the test stimuli comprised 
only the unanalysed image, with no tree-structure or annotation. The purpose of the 
test was to see whether the models could generalise the syntactic patterns of the 












 6.1 Measures 
 
In both tests the output for each stimulus of both models was manually scored 
according to four measures. The measures used are tabulated in table 6.1. All 
measures were taken as percentages; 
 
Measure Description 
Object (O) Judged on the identification of the correct type or types of basic 
object are named. Because, in some outputs, the number of types 
named did not match with the number of types present in the 
stimulus, this was judged as an F1-score; that is to say, as the 
harmonic mean
18
 of precision (the proportion of correct elements 
in the output) and recall (the proportion of elements in the input 
correctly named in the output). If an element was correctly named 
more than once, only the first instance was counted. Half points 
were awarded where; 
a. A dot, dash or wug preceded by “long”, “short” or 
“ADJ”. 
b. A long or short line was named with the correct 
adjective but “NN”, “N” or “ADJ” instead of “line”, or 
with “ADJ line”, or “line” with no adjective. 
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Number (N) Judged according to whether the named objects were correctly 
numbered. Again, this was expressed as an F1-score. 
Relation (R) If the image contained only group of same-type basic objects, or a 
single basic object, full marks on this measure were awarded for 
naming only one object type, and no “to the left of” or “to the 
right of” term, and zero marks are awarded otherwise. If two types 
of basic object are present in the stimulus, full marks are awarded 
if the only two types are named and the left/right relationship 
between them is correctly described. Partial marks are given if a 
correct relationship description is present but more than two 
tokens of object-group namings are present, because in this case 
the system has in such a case had extra chances to get it right. 
Grammaticality 
(G) 
A purely subjective measure of grammaticality and intelligibility. 
Table 6.1; basic objects used in the general test. 
 
An overall score was then given as the average of all four measures, with 
equal weight given to all. Where the Monte-Carlo sample was tied between more than 
one but fewer than twenty-one largest unifiable subsets, the average of all tied outputs 
was taken. Where more than twenty unified subsets were tied, a sample of twenty was 
taken and averaged. 
To give the reader more of a feel for the measures taken, I will present two 




Input = ■■■■■■■■■■     ■     ■ 
Output = three line to the dot of two long dot  
Object Input contains two object groups; a long line and dots. Long 
line is partially named, as “line”, and so scores half marks. 
Dots, in “the dot”, are correctly named. Third named group, 
“two long dots” is spurious. Precision is 1.5 out of 3 = 50%, 
recall is 1.5 out of 2 = 75%, harmonic mean = 60% 
Number Long line is erroneously numbered, dots group is erroneously 
numbered in second named group, “the dot”, but correctly in 
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third, “three long dots”. Precision is 1 out of 3 = 33.33%, recall 
is 1 out of 2 = 50%, harmonic mean = 40% 
Relation No relation is named. 0% 
Grammaticality Phrase makes no sense. 0% 
Overall Average score = 25% 




Input =  
■■■■■■■■■■    ■■■■■■■■■■   ■■■■■   ■■■■■    ■■■■■ 
Output = three short lines to the right of two long line 
Object Short and long lines correctly identified, no spurious outputs 
100% for both precision and recall, harmonic mean = 100% 
Number Short and long lines correctly numbered, no spurious outputs 
100% for both precision and recall, harmonic mean = 100% 
Relation Relation correctly identified. 100% 
Grammaticality Phrase is perfectly intelligible and overall well-formed; 10% 
penalty for missed plural. 90% 
Overall Average score = 97.5% 




The results of the general test on both systems are summarised in table 6.2 below. 
 
 Object Number Relation Grammaticality Overall 
Naïve 54.48% 33.88% 22.70% 28.42% 36.62% 
Binding 76.51% 71.70% 53.99% 57.60% 68.52% 
Table 6.4; Performances of the naïve and binding UDOG systems on the general test. 
 
Eyeballing the data, the overwhelming impression is that the binding system 
far outperforms the naïve system on all measures; overall, the binding performance is 
almost double the naïve, and on individual measures the binding system more than 
doubles the naïve score on all counts except Object, where it is still approximately 
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40% better. It is notable that Object is the only metric for the most part not dependent 
on word-ordering considerations. It is also of interest that, in comparing the three non-
subjective scoring criteria (Object, Number and Relation), for both systems, the 
easiest, Object, was that which depended on the shortest-distance syntactic/semantic 
relations (between noun and adjective within an NN group, if any syntactic relation 
was present at all), and the hardest was that which depended on the longest-distance 
syntactic/semantic relationship, spanning the whole noun phrase. A 2x4 mixed-design 
ANOVA was conducted to test the significance of the differences in table 6.2. 
 
 F Significance. at p 
System 67.71 <0.001 
System * Scoring Criterion 11.31 <0.001 
Scoring Criterion 93.79 <0.001 
Table 6.5; 2x4 mixed design ANOVA 
 
The differences between the two systems, four scoring criteria, and their 
interaction, were all found to be highly significant at p <0.001. This finding was 
investigated in more detail, comparing the individual scoring criteria (within systems) 
using pairwise t-tests (table 6.3) and the systems performance on each scoring 
criterion individually using independent samples t-tests (table 6.4). 
 
 t Significance. at p 
Object – Number 5.92 <0.001 
Object – Relation 10.88 <0.001 
Object – Grammaticality 9.15 <0.001 
Number – Relation 6.31 <0.001 
Number - Grammaticality 5.10 <0.001 
Naïve 
 
Relation - Grammaticality -2.62 0.01 
Object – Number -5.14 <0.001 
Object – Relation 6.51 <0.001 
Object – Grammaticality 5.45 <0.001 





binding Number - Grammaticality 8.84 <0.001 
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(cont’d) Relation - Grammaticality -1.31 0.193 
Table 6.6; Pairwise t-tests for significance of difference between types of measure 
 
 t Significance. at p 
Object 7.143 <0.001 
Number 11.124 <0.001 
Relation 5.656 <0.001 
Grammaticality 5.489 <0.001 
Table 6.7; Independent samples t-tests, for significance of difference between systems 
 
All differences between types of measure proved highly significant, at 
p<0.001, except for between Relation and Grammaticality, which remains significant 
at p<0.05 for Naïve UDOG, and does not attain significance for Binding UDOG. All 
these results were double checked using non-parametric tests (Friedman tests for the 
pairwise t-tests, a Kruskal-Wallis test for the independent samples t-test). 
 
 6.3 Wugs 
 
The results of the Wug test on both systems are summarised in table 6.5 below 
 Object Number Relation Grammaticality Overall 
Naïve 50.65% 29.31% 8.01% 14.54% 25.62% 
Binding 79.45% 94.62% 69.06% 66.00% 77.28% 
Table 6.8; Results from the Wugs test 
 
Eyeballing the data, the difference between the two systems seems to be even 
more marked, most notably in Relation, where Naïve UDOG performs at a fraction of 
its score on the general test, whereas Binding UDOG has actually improved. Indeed, 
the pattern is found across the board, that Naïve UDOG becomes less accurate faced 
with a vocabulary item for which it has no context, whereas Binding UDOG performs 
better than in the general test. 
Theoretically speaking, what is of greatest interest here is effect of the “wug” 
condition on performance, as compared to the general test (or, here, the “no-wug” 
condition), in relation to the Relation score, since the binding of elements into correct 
semantic relations was quire explicitly what the binding system was formulated to do, 
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and to the Overall score. A 72-item random sample was taken at random from the 
general test dataset, so that 2x2 mixed ANOVAs could be performed, between 
“system” and “wugs/no-wugs”, for the Relation score (table 6.6), and the Overall 
score (table 6.7). 
 
 F Significance. at p 
System  237.861 <0.001 
System * Wugs 6.422 0.12 
Wugs 0.483 0.488 
Table 6.9; 2x2 mixed design ANOVA on Overall scores 
 
 F Significance. at p 
System 124.054 <0.001 
System * Wugs 0.194 0.047 
Wugs 93.79 0.66 
Table 6.10; 2x2 mixed design ANOVA on Relation scores 
 
No main effect, in either case, was found for Wugs; which is unsurprising 
given that the difference between wugs and no-wugs in the two systems pull in 
opposite directions. In both cases, significant interaction effects were found for 
System and Wugs, at p<0.05, and highly significant results were found for System, at 
p<0.001. The effect of the Wugs condition was investigated in greater detail using 
independent t-tests (table 6.8) 
 t Significance. at p 
Naïve 3.446 0.01 Relation 
Binding -2.217 0.028 
Naïve 3.15 0.002 Overall 
Binding 168.395 0.027 
Table 6.11; independent t-tests on the effect of the “wugs” condition on relation scores and 
overall scores for both models. 
 
In all cases, the effect of the Wugs parameter is found to be significant at 
p<0.05. It is no surprise that the naïve version suffered in the wug test; it relies wholly 
on the contexts given in exemplars to bind syntactic elements within semantic 
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relations, which it was expressly denied in the wug test. The surprising result is that 
that the improvement in performance in Binding-UDOG also proved significant. The 




The simulations described in the preceding chapter amount to a limited test of a pilot 
for a larger programme of research. In cognitive science, for any genuine empirical 
conclusions to be drawn from a computational model, it will not suffice that the 
model score well on a quantitative test, or even successfully predict findings already 
present in the experimental literature; it must make new predictions, that must then be 
confirmed by new experiments. As yet, UDOG has not attained the level of 
sophistication necessary to make empirical predictions, and so it would be premature 
to draw out conclusions regarding human cognition from the present results. 
However, Binding-UDOG at least must be accounted a success, and a successful pilot 




First of all, Binding-UDOG shows, for the first time, that the Data-Oriented approach 
can be applied to generation tasks, and that a Data-Oriented model can integrate more 
than one cognitive modality. However, the system is in its infancy, and it is of greater 
practical import to draw implications for future work out of the details of the 
successes and the shortcomings of both models. 
 
Recall from §4.3 the question left open regarding the boundaries of the 
algorithm in relation to the implementation; the role of the crossmodals in the model. 
It was remarked that we may simply wish to regard the crossmodals as a technological 
fix for a problem of data-sparsity; that it may be that with a richer dataset, DOG 
would be able to solve the problem of syntactic binding (of ensuring that elements, 
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such as noun phrases, within a sentence or phrase are bound into the position 
corresponding to their semantic role) on the strength of the statistical regularities of 
the training data alone. On the other hand, it may be that we wish to treat them as a 
central feature of the algorithm proper – that DOG in fact cannot adequately model 
compositional language without the level of coupling between signifying and 
signified exemplars found in UDOG, wherein substitution operations are of 
complexes of crossmodally connected root-nodes at crossmodally connected 
complexes of leaf-nodes, rather than of single substitutions of roots and leaves. It 
should by now be clear from the vastly superior performance of Binding compared to 
Naïve UDOG that the latter is the correct answer. The Wug-Test, in particular, was 
especially designed to probe the two systems’ ability to handle this problem; that 
Naïve-UDOG performed significantly worse, while Binding-UDOG in fact performed 
significantly better, serves for as clear an indication as could be hoped for that the 
overall difference in their performance is substantially accounted for by Naïve-
UDOG’s inability to handle binding. However, it remains to be seem whether a Naïve 
approach might be adequate for modelling interactions between non-linguistic 
cognitive modalities. 
 
Although Binding-UDOG’s scores are eminently satisfying for a first pass at a 
novel algorithm, there is much room for improvement, as a such, it would be useful to 





■■■■■■■■■■     ■■■■■■■■■■     ■■■■■■■■■■     ■■■ 
Output = three lines to the dash of three lines 
Object “Dash” and correctly identified, “long lines” partially 
identified as “lines”, plus one spurious output. 1.5 out of 3 = 
50% for precision and 1.5 out of 2 = 75% for recall; harmonic 
mean = 60% 
Number Both non-spurious elements correctly numbered. 2 out of 3 = 
66.67% for precision and 2 out of 2 = 100% for recall, 
harmonic mean = 80% 
Relation No relation identified. 0% 
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Grammaticality Makes no sense. 0% 
Overall Average score = 35% 
Table 7.1; An example of the most common error of Binding-UDOG; taken from General Test 
run. 
 
This type of error, of the form “Concrete-NP(X)
19
 to the Concrete-NP(Y) of 
Concrete-NP(X)”, accounts for over 90% of those outputs made by Binding-UDOG 
on the General Test which scored less than 50% overall. It cannot be dismissed as an 
artefact of the unification process, whereby no derivations contain two instances of 
Concrete-NP(X), but the unification process combines trees with the Concrete-NP(X) 
in either leftmost of rightmost position and an incomplete branch on the other side to 
make trees with Concrete-NP(X) on both sides; 11 derivations were found in the 500 
that generated the above output with an NP containing “line” in both positions, as in 
the following example; 
 
*DET* long line to *DET* *N* of a long line 
 
It is worth noting that, given the form of trees generated by the CorpusMonkey 
script, in any bimodal tree where two groups of objects are in a left-of/right-of 
relation, as in figure 3.2, one of the visual tree nodes (directly above one of the groups 
of same-type objects or the other will be crossmodally linked to three of the five 
nodes in the verbal tree labelled “NP”. Figure 7.1 shows the same tree-pair as figure 
3.2, but with a different set of crossmodals shown. 
                                                 
19
 That is to say, an NP of the form DET/NUM (ADJ) dot/dash/line (PL). 
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Figure 7.1: Tree-Pair taken from the General Test Treebank, with an incomplete set of 
crossmodals shown. 
 
Note that the NP nodes over “the left” and “the left of two dots” cannot both 
form head-nodes of verbal subtrees in a single bimodal subtree according to the 
wellformedness criteria  stipulated for Binding UDOG in §3.3 (criterion 5, 
specifically), whereas either can co-occur with the NP node over “a short line” as 





DET PREP NP N 
















Figure 7.2: A legal bimodal subtree of Binding-UDOG of the tree-pair in figure 7.1, with two 
verbal subtrees headed with NP nodes. 
 
Note that where Binding-UDOG produces a bimodal subtree like that in figure 
7.2, it has no way to determine which of the two NP-labelled substitution sites should 
receive which verbal subtree, and must select randomly. One possible solution to this 
problem would be to attach labels to crossmodals, so that those that correspond to 
concrete reference relations (in figure 7.2, the purple crossmodal) and those that relate 
to part-whole relations (the red crossmodal) are distinguished, guaranteeing that a 
verbal subtree the root of which is joined to the root of the visual subtree by a 
concrete crossmodal can only be substituted at a substitution site joined to the visual 
substitution site by a crossmodal of the same kind. 
 
7.2 Object-naming in the one-word stage  
 
One outcome of the tests performed on the two UDOG systems was that Binding 












instead expected that it would either show no significant effect, or that its 
performance would be decremented, either to the same degree as the Naïve system, 
indicating that crossmodals should be seen as a technological fix for sparse data, or to 
a significantly less degree, indicating that crossmodals should be seen as an essential 
feature of the algorithm. However, it is easy to figure out just how the Wug condition 
helped Binding UDOG along. One common type of error is illustrated in a real 





Input =  ■■■■■     ■     ■      ■ 
Output = a dot *PL* to the right *PREP* a short line to the 
line of two *NN*  
Object “Dot” and “short line” correctly identified, plus two spurious 
outputs 2 out of 4 = 50% for precision and 2 out of 2 = 100% 
for recall, harmonic mean = 66.67% 
Number One short correctly numbered, three dots not correctly 
numbered. 1 out of 4 = 25% for precision and 1 out of 2 = 50% 
for recall, harmonic mean = 33.33% 
Relation Relation correctly identified; score halved, however, because 
the output contains two potential loci for relation terms. 50% 
Grammaticality First half is more or less sensible and grammatical, second half 
is gibberish; 10% penalties plural marker ad preposition in first 
half left unrealised. 30% 
Overall Average score = 45% 
Table 7.2; real example of common error from the output of Binding-UDOG on the General 
Test 
 
What has happened here is that structure for the relation expression has been 
imported into the output from two separate sources; one coming with material 
contributing to the description of the single short line, the other coming with the what 
I presume to be an abortive attempt at describing two or the three dots; in both cases, 
the object-and-number describing material came bound up with relation-describing 
material, and these together caused a confused and ill-formed output. In the Wug Test, 
the description of the wug cannot come with such extraneous material, since the only 
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exemplars associating the word “wug” with images of wugs contain nothing more 
than a single wug, described as “a wug” (see figure 5.1). 
 
This suggests an interesting hypothesis regarding First Language Acquisition, 
to be followed up if further work on UDOG proves successful. Binding UDOG 
benefits notably from having access to isolated examples or words paired with their 
referents. Bates, Bretherton and Snyder (1988) outline a “two-strand” theory of 
individual differences in First Language Acquisition, wherein two main learning 
strategies employed by infant language learners; “Strand two” is characterised by 
slow vocabulary growth and a tendency towards holophrases in which multi-word 
utterances are used as unanalysed wholes, but of greater interest here is “Strand one”. 
Below is Bates et al’s (ibid.) full tabulation of the key features of “Strand one” 
semantic learning; 
 
• High proportion of nounsin first 50 words 
• Single words in early speech 
• Imitates object names 
• Greater variety within lexical categories 
• Meaningful elements only 
• High adjective use 
• Context-flexible use of names 
• Rapid vocabulary growth 
Bates et al, ibid. 
 
If some mechanism like Binding UDOG does indeed form the basis of human 
linguistic production, might it be that the comparatively rapid vocabulary learning of 
“Strand one” learners, and their ability to use names context-flexibly, owes to their 
creation of exemplars of a noun linked to its referent, isolated from context, just like 
the “wug” exemplars in the Wug Test in §§5.2 and 6.3, which are then available to the 
child as part of her exemplar-base. This suggests a direction for the empirical testing 





7.3 Crossmodals, network structure and access consciousness 
 
One major direction for future UDOG research will be to expand the model to 
encompass multiple cognitive modalities, so that a single linguistic output can bind 
together meanings drawn from a diversity of modalities which approximates the 
“saturatedness” of real human language use in naturalistic conditions. I wish to, rather 
speculatively, draw out one possible consequence if such developments of the model 
were to prove successful. 
 
 Block (1995) distinguishes two understandings of consciousness; “Access-
Consciousness” (A-Consciousness), characterised as the availability of cognitive 
content for report, reasoning and the control of behaviour, and “Phenomenal 
Consciousness” (P-Consciousness); the qualitative “what-it’s-like” of experience, 
which may well be, as Chalmers (1996) postulates, beyond the reach of scientific 
investigation altogether, or else is, as Dennett (1991) holds, strictly reducible to A-
Consciousness. Disavowing any consideration of the reducibility or otherwise of P-
Consciousness, it may be that “saturated” UDOG models of the type suggested above 
may offer a the basis of a novel theory of A-Consciousness, and the role played 
therein by language, or rather, by particular exemplars in the language modality. 
 
One of the most interesting developments in Graph Theory in the last decade, 
with applications in as diverse fields as Physics, Urban Planning, Genetics, 
Neuroscience and Sociology, is the theory of Small World Networks (Watts and 
Strogatz 1998). A Small World Network is a random graph in which the considerable 
majority of nodes have only local connections (which in network terms, means only 
having connections where, if x is connected to y and y is connected to z, there is a high 
probability that x will also be connected to z), but there exist a small number of 
“supernodes” that have very many of non-local connections. The consequence of this 
network structure is that it is possible to go from any node in the network to any other 
in a small number of moves. This of course is not the first time that an application of 
Small World Networks to cognition and consciousness has been thought of; see 
Roxin, Reicke and Solla (2004), for example. What I do wish to offer as novel is the 
suggestion of a network specifically of exemplars, connected intramodally at potential 
substitution sites, but also crossmodally. Doubtless crossmodal connections also exist 
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between non-linguistic exemplars (between vision and motor control for instance), but 
what is unique to human consciousness is the role played by linguistic exemplars as 
supernodes, giving us a more integrated form of A-Consciousness than any other 
species. What I am proposing here is not a psycholinguistics-style boxes-and-arrows 
diagram with the “language box” in the middle, but rather a decentralised network in 
which concrete exemplars across all modalities of cognition are joined up, mostly by 
local connections, but with a population of supernodes which join up exemplars from 





The achievement of the model itself is small, but what it has shown to be possible – 
generation and multimodal integration under a Data-Oriented framework, represent 
considerable advances for Data-Oriented approaches to Cognitive Science and 
Artificial Intelligence. On the webpage for the his new Cognitive Systems research 
group at the University of St. Andrews
20
, Bod (2006a) proposes the goal of the new 
group to be “to develop one system that unifies different modalities” (author’s 
emphasis); certainly the models of language, music and reasoning in Bod (2005) show 
that unimodal DOP models can be used to unify cognitive modalities under a single 
formalism; but the programme of multimodal Data-Oriented research that the present 
work warrants, if successful, offers a way to integrate different modalities within a 
single model. 
                                                 
20
 Which I will be joining in September 2006.  
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